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Abstract
The aim of the present paper is to explore the effect that the de-agentification process implemented by 
the Spanish government has had on public expenditure since 2010. Specifically, we analyse the effect 
of the actions carried out on the number of public agencies. Our sample is composed of a set of data 
from 17 Spanish Regional Governments in the period 2003-2017. Based on panel data estimations, the 
findings show a significantly positive association between the number of public agencies and public 
expenditure. Therefore, these findings extend the debate about the potential benefits for government 
concerning the creation of public agencies. 
Keywords: De-agentification, Public agencies, Public expenditure, Spanish Regional Governments.
JEL Classification: H5, H6, H7.
1. Introduction
Efficiency pressures in the public sector have been intensified since the global financial 
crisis (Elston and MacCarthaigh, 2016). The main aims sought are an increase of effective-
ness and equity in public sector actions, a reduction of administrative costs, a growth of trans-
parency and accountability, a rise of the responsibilisation of the providers of services and 
the introduction of market-based mechanisms. Different actions have been developed which 
have had important functional, organisational and institutional consequences, given that the 
crisis has highlighted some problems related to the structure and the efficiency of the pub-
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lic sector (Bolgherini, 2014; Bolgherini, 2015; García et al., 2019; Kamkhaji and Radaelli, 
2013; MacCarthaigh, 2014). Among these measures, those aimed at reducing the size of the 
public sector stand out, either re-centralising public administrations1, regrouping territorial 
entities –provinces, local governments, etc.– eliminating public bodies or reducing staff. In 
this sense, the termination of quasi-autonomous non-governmental organisations (hereinaf-
ter: quangos), agencies, public firms and other organisms2 has been one of the strategies of 
administrative rationalisation applied in the wake of the global financial crisis (Bolgherini, 
2014; MacCarthaigh, 2014). 
Since 1980 there has been an increase in the number of quangos in the countries that 
applied the postulates of New Public Management (hereinafter: NPM) (Van Thiel, 2004). 
These quangos were created with the aim of reducing the rigidity of bureaucracies, avoiding 
the surveillance exerted by financial and administrative comptrollers, abandoning the public 
and administrative regulatory framework, favouring a greater managerial initiative and in-
creasing the relevance of citizens, seen in terms of stakeholders (Alonso et al., 2015; Hood, 
1995; MacCarthaigh, 2014). This was meant to increase the flexibility of the management 
of the public administration and save costs (Alonso et al., 2015; Hood, 1995; Laking, 2005; 
MacCarthaigh, 2014; Óngaro et al., 2006; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992; Park, 2013; Peters et 
al., 2011; Pollitt and Bouckaert, 2000). This process is known as agentification (Flinders and 
Smith, 1998). More recently, however, in the wake of the global financial crisis and suddenly 
faced with an enormous budgetary deficit, quango rationalization became a financial rather 
than an administrative modernisation issue (Dommett and MacCarthaigh, 2016). This pro-
cess is known as de-agentification (RandMa-Liiv et al., 2011). In this context, rationalisation 
is generally interpreted as an overall reduction in the population of agencies, mainly (though 
not exclusively) through the termination of existing organisations (MacCarthaigh, 2014).
Particularly, Spain, as a member country of the European Union, has transferred all the 
requirements of the Pact of Stability and Growth to its legal regulation via the reform of arti-
cle 135 of its Constitution and its development in later laws of Budget Stability and Financial 
Sustainability. The majority of policies adopted by Spain in the period 2010-2012 aimed at 
controlling a growing budget deficit (Gil et al., 2019; Martí and Pérez, 2015).
Thus, the main objective of the present paper is to explore the effect that the de-agentifi-
cation process implemented by the Spanish government has had on public expenditure since 
2010. Although, the reform has affected a diverse set of public factors, we specifically ana-
lyse the effect of the actions carried out on the number of quangos. This is an important issue 
for regulators and governments. Moreover, as an additional objective, this paper provides an 
analysis of the effect of the creation of quangos on public expenditure.
Our sample is composed of 17 Spanish Regional Governments3 (hereinafter: CCAA) 
from Spain for the period 2003 to 2017. This sample provides a particularly interesting sce-
nario because, on the one hand, Spain is the fifth economy of the Eurozone and it has been one 
of the countries most affected by the economic crisis (Gallego and Marx, 2017) and, on the 
other hand, the Spanish state is highly decentralised4 with large vertical imbalances where the 
CCAA generate 30% of public expenditure and they have increased the number of quangos 
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that depend on them (Fernández and De la Casa, 2016). In fact, they have become the main 
agent of public spending in Spain because they have assumed many responsibilities in health 
and education (Fernández and García, 2013; García et al., 2019). Moreover, as a consequence 
of these responsibilities and their needs to increase financing it is very relevant to know if 
public expenditure has been assigned efficiently (García et al., 2019). Thus, the CCAA are 
key actors in ensuring the sustainability and inclusiveness of the reforms (OECD, 2016). 
Our results point to a positive association between the number of quangos and the public 
expenditure. In spite of NPM considering that the creation of quangos should save public ex-
penditure, our findings contradict this argument. This is a relevant issue since quangos were 
created to save costs and improve public sector performance. However, in Spain these agen-
cies do not seem to reduce government expenditure. Therefore, one of the main contributions 
of this paper is the empirical evidence obtained in relation to these agencies not managing 
to reduce public expenditure. On the other hand, from 2010 the Spanish Government has 
implemented several measures to reduce public expenditure. Among others, these policies 
have been the reduction of the number of CCAA quangos. Our results confirm the efficiency 
of this policy. This evidence contributes to the public administration literature by extending 
the debate concerning whether the implementation of measures proposed by NPM achieves 
a reduction of public expenditure as could be thought when it was created. Moreover, it is a 
relevant issue for governments and regulators because they have the capacity to make deci-
sions in order to ensure the efficiency of the public sector. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section reviews the theoretical frame-
work and formulates the main hypotheses. Section 3 explains the sample, the variables, and 
the method employed in the empirical analysis. Section 4 reports the main results and provides 
a discussion of these findings. The final section summarises the main conclusions of our study.
2. Theoretical background 
2.1. Agentification
Neo-institutional economic theories, such as principal agent and transaction cost eco-
nomics, are used to arguing why agentification would lead to improved public sector per-
formance since it would drive towards specialised and expert public services which could 
improve quality and efficiency in the public sector (Peters et al., 2011; Overman and Van 
Thiel, 2016; Van Thiel, 2004).
After years of applying NPM, different authors have posed the matter and questioned that 
the measures of reducing the size of the public sector (outsourcing, decentralisation and agen-
tification) have generated cost savings for the public sector (Delgado et al., 2019). In this sense, 
Alonso et al. (2015) consider that if outsourcing or externalisation is associated with a reduc-
tion of public expenditure in its first periods, with the passing of time these positive effects are 
fundamentally neutralised by the increase in the prices that private firms charge public bodies. 
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James and Van Thiel (2013) consider that decentralisation prevents public administra-
tions from benefitting from economies of scale, and also generates a loss of coordination be-
tween the different levels of government, causing duplicities and, ultimately, increasing costs. 
On the other hand, there are those who consider that agentification is a complex and 
multidimensional process which does not guarantee greater levels of efficiency because it in-
volves, among others, the following risks: perceptions of reduced transparency, an increased 
fragmentation, and duplication, a loss of control of agency operations, an abrogation of po-
litical accountability, an evasion of general rules for staffing and budgets, and an exposure of 
government to financial and employment risks (Smoke, 2003; 2015). Specifically, for LGs, 
Zafra et al. (2013) state that those which decentralise their services to agencies have worse 
levels of financial performance and if, moreover, they have not established the necessary con-
trol mechanisms, the agencies can bring about significant increases of the debt level (Chris-
tensen and Laegreid, 2015). In this sense, Delgado et al. (2019) for a sample of Spanish 
regions in the period 2002-2018 find a positive association between outsourcing and public 
expenditure, therefore externalisation can compromise the efficiency of the public sector.
Concretely, all the territorial levels into which the Spanish state is divided have resorted to 
the creation of instrumental bodies that have had diverse names and configurations (autonomous 
organisms, business agencies, public enterprises, public law bodies submitted to private laws, 
etc.). The regulation of the structure and composition of the public administration has been the 
aim of different norms of a diverse nature throughout recent years, both at the state and the au-
tonomous and local levels. In the case of the State, the last reform is the publication of the Law 
40/2015 of the legal system of the Public Sector in which it is established (art. 2) that this will be 
made up of: (1) the General Administration of the State, (2) the Administrations of the CCAA, 
(3) the Entities which make up the Local Administration and (4) the institutional public sector. 
Meanwhile, the institutional public sector will be composed of (art. 84): (1) whatever public 
organisms and bodies of public law, (2) the bodies of private law linked with or dependent on 
the Public Administrations which, in any case, have administrative powers, (3) the public Uni-
versities which will be governed by their specific norms and additionally by the Law 40/2015. 
In the case of the CCAA, as each has been assuming competences transferred by the central 
government, an increase in the number of quangos has been noted (Fernández and De la Casa, 
2016; Fernández and García, 2013). Thus, between 2003 and 2010, which could be called an 
agentification period, there was a 58% increase in the number of CCAA quangos (see Figure 1).
In line with previous arguments, the increase of efficiency and cost savings were, among 
others, the reasons which justified the creation and proliferation of the number of quangos. 
Yet because of the growth in their number, quangos have caused an increase of workers and, 
consequently, the salary cost that is brought about by creating them (MacCarthaigh, 2014; 
Óngaro et al., 2006; Park, 2013), which in turn raises public expenditure (Hernández and 
Pérez, 2015). Therefore, the following hypothesis is formulated:
H1:  Changes in the number of quangos generate changes in public expenditure in the 
opposite sign.
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2.2. De-agentification process 
Since 2007 the economies of the European countries have faced, to a greater or lesser 
extent, the negative effects of the economic crisis and pressures related to efficiency in the 
public sector have been intensified. In this sense, García et al. (2019) reveal that in Spain 
the recession has produced a reduction in the efficiency of the CCAA. Thus, to mitigate the 
effect of the economic crisis and seeking significant cost savings, governments have lowered 
budgets and have raised the demand for public services (Elston and MacCarthaigh, 2016).
All of this has led to a review of the public spending level in the European context. Main-
ly, two action lines have been implemented to decrease this:
a)  Reduction of the size of the public sector. The measures taken go from the definitive 
elimination of some bodies to a remodelling or restructuring of the existing ones. It is 
interesting to observe how such an enthusiasm for agentification has gradually given 
way to centralisation and loss of agency autonomy (RandMa-Liiv et al., 2011).
b)  Increase of the efficiency of the public bodies. To do so, actions are carried out aimed 
at, among others, reducing the levels of corruption, modernising organisational struc-
tures, implementing and development e-government, fostering the centralisation of 
purchases, increasing the quality in the services provision, and reducing duplicities 
and redundancies.
In the European context, Table 1 describes the measures implemented by some Europe-
an governments to: (1) modernise the public sector, (2) reform the territorial structure and 
institutional administrations in order to reduce the size of public sector, (3) and cut public 
expenditure.
Figure 1
NUMBER OF CCAA QUANGOS THROUGHOUT THE AGENTIFICATION PERIOD
Source: Own elaboration.
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Meanwhile, the measures adopted by Spain to reduce public expenditure are similar to 
those adopted in European countries (Martí and Pérez, 2015; Gil et al., 2019; Salmon, 2017; 
Viver, 2010):
a)  Stimulus measures and structural reforms have been introduced by the Central Gov-
ernment with the aim of restructuring diverse sectors of the economy to ‘improve the 
economic efficiency of Spain’ that should ‘accelerate the updating of the production 
model’ and lead to ‘a new step in the modernisation of the Spanish economy’:
 i)  The ‘Spanish Plan to Simulate the Economy and Employment’ approved by the state 
government in 2009.
 ii)  The labour reform was approved first by the government law-decree dated June 16th 
2010 and finally by the law dated September 9th 2010. The main goals of this reform 
are to lower the cost of indemnification for dismissed workers, to make dismissals eas-
ier and to reduce the differences between permanent and temporary work contracts. 
 iii)  Three measures have been implemented in the realm of Social Security Funds: 
the freezing of pensions during 2010 and 2011, the postponement of the retire-
ment age from 65 to 67, and a lengthening in the contribution period taken into 
account when calculating pensions. 
 iv)  Regarding the financial systems, it has forced them to merge, making economic aid 
contingent upon merging and threatening to intervene if they do not do so, and they 
are expected to exercise their financial activity in a way quite similar to banks while 
maintaining –at least partially– their character as foundations that pursue social goals. 
b)  Austerity measures were adopted to reduce the public deficit and the public debt. 
These include a wide range of measures that the state began to adopt in early 2010. 
In 2010 the article 135 of the Constitution was reformed in order to limit the level of 
public debt and public spending and in 2012 the law of Budget Stability and Financial 
Sustainability was passed. 
Later, in 2012, the Commission for the Reform of the Public Administrations was created 
for the specific design of measures with the goal of improving the efficiency and effective-
ness of public activity, without undermining the quality of the services provided (hereinafter: 
CORA). CORA elaborated a report in June 2013 with 138 measures whose target was the im-
provement and simplification of the functioning of the public administrations (CORA, 2013; 
Martí and Pérez, 2015). The Office for the Execution of the Reform of the Administration 
was created in 2013 to carry out, boost and follow-up these measures. 
In addition, from December 2009 until July 2012 a set of fiscal measures was adopted 
to increase taxes (Gil et al., 2019). Concretely, it produced significant increases in personal 
income tax, corporate income tax, and value added tax, as well as the suppression of a large 
number of deductions (Gil et al., 2019). Some of this fiscal policy had effects until the years 
2013-2014, after the economic recovery. Regarding fiscal policies in Spain, Martí and Pérez 
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(2015) consider three phases: (i) 2008-2009, the aim of the counter-cyclical measures imple-
mented was public revenue-decreasing and spending-increasing; (ii) 2010-2011, the first stage 
of the consolidation of the fiscal process; (iii) 2012, the second stage of the fiscal consolida-
tion process, several number of structural fiscal reforms were implemented during this period.
As Spain is territorially decentralised, some measures exclusively affect the Central Ad-
ministration, while others are targeted at the CCAA and LGs. However, a second basic fea-
ture of these measures is the almost absolute preeminence and leadership of the State over the 
CCAA and LGs. This phenomenon is common to the majority of other decentralised states 
and to the majority of preceding economic crises, and in fact it is endorsed by one sector in 
the theory of fiscal federalism. The state’s leadership role can be seen in both the economic 
volume of the measures adopted and in the direction and coordination of the process for the 
stimulus, austerity and structural reform measures (see Table 1) (Viver, 2010; CORA, 2013; 
OECD, 2016; Salmon, 2017). However, some measures promoted by the Central Adminis-
tration were applied in a lax manner by the CCAA in spite of the mechanisms adopted by the 
Central Government (Martí and Pérez, 2015).
Focusing on the process of de-agentification at the Central Government, the Law 40/2015 
plans to rationalise, organise and simplify the state, foundational and business public sector 
and reform the regulation applicable5 and means to keep only the bodies necessary for carry-
ing out the functions legally entrusted to the public sector. It therefore eliminates those spe-
cialised figures that, without much justification, encouraged the exception of the application 
of administrative controls which must exist in all public actions (Boto, 2015). It introduced a 
regime of transformations and mergers of public organisms of the same legal nature for the 
state public sector, either via their extinction or integration into a new public organism, or via 
their absorption by another one that already existed.
For their part, the CCAA and the Government of Spain signed a first agreement in 20106, 
concerning the sustainability of public finances for the 3-year period 2010-13. The approval 
of a plan of rationalisation of the structures of their general administrations and business pub-
lic sectors that, with the intention of improving efficiency and reducing public spending, will 
lead to the dismantling, recasting or restructuring the organs which are necessary (Agreement 
1/2010, Council of Tax and Financial Policy). 
Following this first agreement, and to continue advancing in the commitments of reor-
ganising the public sector, a second agreement was adopted in January 2012.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the number of quangos by CCAA. They have experi-
enced a considerable reduction from 2010.
In order to go more thoroughly into the reforms, in 2018 a Strategic Plan for the promotion 
and transformation of public administration was designed, which proposed as strategic objectives:
a) The digital transformation of public administration.
b) A boost of public governance.
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c) An open government strategy and improvement of transparency.
d) An improvement and modernisation of public employment.
As a result, one of the measures implemented by countries to decrease public expenditure has 
been de-agentification, as it is presumed that the dismantling of quangos will generate important 
cost savings (Carpenter and Lewis, 2004; MacCarthaigh, 2014; Nakrosis and Budraitis, 2012; 
Sarapuu, 2012). Nonetheless, the results in countries such as Italy have not been in this sense 
(Cabinet Office, 2015; Deloitte, 2015). Based on this, the following hypothesis is established: 
H2:  Changes in the number of quangos as a result of the process of cost reduction gen-
erate changes in public expenditure in the same sign.
3. Sample, variables and methodology
3.1. Sample 
Spain, Ireland, Greece and Portugal have been the countries of the European Union in 
which the economic crisis has had a greater negative impact (OECD, 2016; Gallego and 
Marx, 2017). This is shown by the levels of deficit reached, among other matters (see Figure 
3). The deficit of the whole of the Spanish public administrations reached its maximum (-11 
percent of GDP) in 2009, maintained these levels until 2012 and from then began to decrease. 
In 2017 it was around -3.1 percent of the GDP. In all these years this deficit has been above 
that of the average of the Eurozone. 
Given the highly decentralised nature of the Spanish state the CCAA are key actors in en-
suring the sustainability and inclusiveness of the reforms (OECD, 2016). Concretely, within the 
Figure 2
NUMBER OF CCAA QUANGOS THROUGHOUT THE DE-AGENTIFICATION PERIOD
Source: Own elaboration.
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whole public sector, the general administration subsector is what generates greater figures of pub-
lic expenditure –around 37 percent– followed by the CCAA subsector –around 30 percent– the 
Social Security Funds –around 23 percent– and lastly the LGs –around 11 percent (see Figure 4).
Thus, the study employed panel data for the period 2003 to 2017 and this is composed of 17 
CCAA from Spain with a total of 240 observations. To implement this approach towards evalu-





NON FINANCIAL EXPENDITURE BY SPANISH PUBLIC SUBSECTORS
Source: IGAE, 2018.
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3.2. Variables
First, we have to define the concept of the Public Sector. To identify the units which are 
included within the sector of the public administrations we have adopted the methodological 
criterion of institutional classification established by the European System of National and 
Regional Accounts of the European Region (hereinafter: SEC 2010)7. The Public Adminis-
trations sector (S13) includes producers not in public markets, irrespective of their legal form 
(administrative organs of the different levels of government, other public organisms, founda-
tions, agencies, trading companies which are institutional units and sell their production at 
prices that do not cover 50 percent of the costs of production, instrumental societies which do 
not carry out a genuine economic activity, and consortiums). In turn, this is subdivided into 
different subsectors: S1311-State, S1312-CCAA, and S1313-LGs.
In this work financial and non-financial measures are incorporated to quantify the size 
of the public sector of the CCAA (Mink, 2004). The measures chosen reflect the role played 
by the public sector in its action: generator of spending, borrower and employer (Peters and 
Verrinder, 2004).
The main dependent variable of the study aims to capture the total public expenditure 
(‘Government expenditure’). In accordance with previous studies, this variable is calculated 
by the ratio of total public expenditure to total population (Cai et al., 2018; Rahman, 2008).
There is not a single statistical measurement generally accepted to quantify public expendi-
ture. One of the most used, for its easy access, is that which is determined from the information 
contained in the liquidations of the public administrations’ budgets (Domínguez and Rueda, 
2005; Dublin et al., 2004). Taking into account the diverse nature of the concepts included in the 
budgets, public expenditure can be quantified including all of them or only some (Mink, 2004):
—  Total public expenditure, which includes current expenditure, capital expenditure, 
transfers and borrowing operations. This has the inconvenience that it includes bor-
rowing accounts, which are not properly measures of public expenditure.
—  Non-financial public expenditure, which only includes current expenditure, capital 
expenditure and transfers. This therefore leaves aside expenditure related to financial 
assets and liabilities. This really does not represent items of expenditure, but acquisi-
tions and disposals of financial assets and liabilities that serve to finance expenditure. 
—  Non-financial public expenditure without transfers. Thus defined, it only includes 
current expenditure and capital, excluding transfers as, in its role of producer, the 
size of the public sector does not need to include them, given that they do not affect 
it (Pigou, 1947).
Notwithstanding, all these variables are determined based on the data extracted from the 
different budget liquidations which, in the Spanish case, only the administrative bodies elab-
orate. Therefore, it would be incomplete as it does not include the expenditure of agencies, 
quangos, public firms, etc.
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That is why to measure public expenditure in this work we have chosen the variable 
‘Non-Financial Expenditure’ (hereinafter: NFE) of subsector S1312 of the CCAA that the 
SEC 2010 supplies, which does include the expenditure of the quangos8.
On the other hand, the main explanatory variable employed in the study, proxying the 
impact of the expenditure review, is defined as the number of agencies and public organisa-
tions of each CCAA, included in the Inventory of Public Bodies (‘Quangos’). Quangos were 
created to control or reduce public expenditure. However, as has been explained before, there 
is not enough evidence about the efficiency of these agencies. In this sense, the main objec-
tive of this paper is to contribute to clarifying the real function of quangos in the public sec-
tor. Therefore, we have considered the number of quangos as the main independent variable 
because we try to explain some factors that are associated with public expenditure.
Based on the previous literature (Alonso et al., 2015; Hoffmann, 2004; Peters and Ver-
rinder, 2004; Sala, 2013), we control for several variables that are felt to be related to govern-
ment expenditure: salary and the number of public employees, leverage, unemployment rate, 
and a time variable. First, the salary of government employment (‘Salary’) is calculated as the 
ratio of salary of total public employees to the GDP (Alonso et al., 2015; Hoffmann, 2004; 
Peters and Verrinder, 2004). Second, public employees (‘Government employment’) have 
been calculated as the ratio of government employees to the working-age population (Hoff-
mann, 2004; Mink, 2004; Peters and Verrinder, 2004). Meanwhile, leverage (‘Leverage’) is 
calculated as the ratio of public debt to GDP. In addition, we consider the unemployment 
rate (‘Unemployment’). Finally, in Spain the economic crisis has produced new regulatory 
controls of the CCAA (Sala, 2013) which have been included in the cost reduction process. 
Thus, to consider the process of de-agentification and test our research hypotheses we have 
included in the empirical model a dummy variable to capture the effect of the period of cost 
reduction (‘Level shift 2010’). This period started in the year 2010, therefore, this variable 
takes the value 1 from the period 2010-2017 and 0 otherwise.
3.3. Empirical model
To test the hypotheses formulated, we employed a fixed effect panel data estimation 
model for the regression analysis with Public Expenditure as the dependent variable. A panel 
data approach allows us to effectively control for possible unobserved heterogeneity (i.e., 
the existence of time-invariant explanatory variables which are not observed but correlated 
with the observed explanatory variables). Therefore, within-firm changes are used to explain 
variations in the dependent variable (Coles et al., 2008). The general model used to test our 
first hypothesis is presented in Equation 1:
Government expenditurei,t = β0 + β1 Quangosi,t + β2 Salaryi,t + 
β3 Government employmenti,t + β4 Leveragei,t + β5 Unemploymenti,t + (1)
β6 Level shift 2010i,t + εit 
where β0 is the intercept and βi is the coefficient of each independent variable. The sub-index 
i identifies the individual, and the sub-index t identifies the time and εit, the error term.
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Moreover, to verify H2, interaction tests were performed to explore the moderating effect 
of the period of expenditure review on the overall government expenditure. These analyses 
were run as two-way interactions and the variables were centred at their within-firm means, 
which control for the unobserved time-invariant characteristics of firms (Banalieva et al., 
2015).
According to Simon-Cosano et al. (2014), another statistical technique is applied as a 
robustness test: Panel Corrected Standard Errors (PCSEs). This estimation to handle a possi-
ble contemporaneous correlation of the errors (i. e., being correlated across trusts within the 
same time period) and heteroscedasticity (i. e., having unequal variances across the different 
CCAA subsets). 
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Descriptive statistics
The number of CCAA quangos grew until 2010. This growth can be explained by the 
process developed by Spanish Government to transfer responsibilities to the CCAA, which 
led to an increase in the number of public enterprises (Fernández and García, 2013). From 
2010 the number of quangos decreased because the measures of rationalisation of the auton-
omous public sector began to be implemented and a decrease was noted (see Table 3). From 
then, they started to go down and this reduction is most accentuated in 2012 (10.36 percent). 
In the last years we can speak of a quasi-stability in the figures. However, an increase in 2017 
has occurred. In the Spanish case, the causes that lead to de-agentification have been external 
and have obeyed the tax pressures and deficit reduction coming from the European Union 
(Carpenter and Lewis, 2004; Lewis, 2002; Park, 2013). However, each CCAA decides what 
actions to take on the quangos.
In spite of the public spending control measures in Spain which began to be implemented 
in 2010, the total public expenditure presents annual rises until 2010 when it starts to de-
crease, the most important drop being in 2012 (9.50 percent). 
Table 3
EVOLUTION OF THE NUMBER OF QUANGOS AND PUBLIC EXPENDITURE
Number of Variation of Variation of Year quangos quangos public expenditure
2003 1446 — —
2004 1501 3.80% 9.88%
2005 1556 3.66% 11.82%
2006 1663 6.88% 8.89%
2007 1719 3.37% 8.88%
2008 1642 -4.48% 11.07%
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2009 1913 16.50% 5.42%
2010 2258 18.03% -2.23%
2011 2221 -1.64% -3.03%
2012 1991 -10.36% -9.50%
2013 1927 -3.21% -2.44%
2014 1782 -7.52% -0.06%
2015 1747 -1.96% 2.80%
2016 1726 -1.20% -1.30%
2017 1746 1.16% 3.33%
Regarding the particular characteristics of the quangos that compose the sample, Ta-
ble 4 describes their legal form and the type of activity that they developed in the period 
2010-2017, as data for previous years are not available. On the one hand, four categories are 
identified for the legal form: business consortium, anonymous societies, non-profit entities 
and agencies, public enterprises and autonomous entities. For all the period each one of them 
represents around 25% of the total number of quangos. On the other hand, in relation to the 
type of activity, the categories Health activities and social services and others are the most 
representative with a percentage around 17% and 21% respectively. In addition, the activity 
of other services is very significant for the years 2011 and 2012. Further, the type of activity 
that considers the water supply, sanitation, and waste is less representative, with a percentage 
around 4%.
Table 5 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables included in the statistical anal-
yses. As regards the measure of government expenditure, it can be seen that the mean value 
of this variable is around 3,400 €, which represents the public expenditure per capita by the 
CCAA. On the other hand, the mean of the number of quangos is 112. The level of the stand-
ard deviation of this variable shows the differences in the number of quangos dependent on 
the largest CCAA –measured by both the population and the NFE– compared to the smaller 
ones. However, the competences developed by the quangos of each CCAA are the same.
The Pearson bivariate correlations between the variables of interest were well below the 
normal threshold levels. Nevertheless, we employed Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) analysis 
to alleviate concerns of potential multicollinearity. As the lack of multicollinearity is broadly 
accepted when VIF values are under 5 (Studenmund, 1997), these figures further supported 
our choice of variables and confidence in the results of the regression estimations.
On the other hand, the correlation matrix shows a positive and significant association 
between government expenditure and the Level shift 2010. Thus, we have run Chow’s test 
(Chow, 1960) to identify significant differences due to the de-agentification process. The 
results show a structural change (p-value = 0.000) as consequences of the implementation of 
measures proposed during this process.
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4.2. Regression analysis
The results of the multivariate analysis are presented in Table 6. This set of regressions 
focused on investigating whether the number of quangos would be related to higher public 
expenditure. We have considered two time-related variables as a control: Level shift 2010 
and year dummies. Thus, Model 1 reports results introducing the variable Level shift 2010 
and Model 2 shows results considering year dummies. The findings revealed that there is a 
positive association between the number of quangos and public expenditure (Model 1). Thus, 
H1 is rejected. Quangos were created by the public sector at the beginning of the 80s with the 
postulates of NPM. The main idea was the flexibility of the public sector’s task, which aimed 
to achieve a higher efficiency and a reduction of public-sector expenditure. Thus, with the 
application of the NPM postulates in Spain the creation of instrumental bodies was fostered, 
their number growing until 2011 (Óngaro et al., 2006). Nevertheless, our results indicate that 
this main objective of a reduction of public expenditure has not been achieved. This can be 
explained by one of the most characteristic features of instrumental administrations in the 
search for this flexibility being to flee administrative law and to end up in private law. As a 
result of this, these bodies are not subject to strict administrative controls and public expendi-
ture control (Fernández and García, 2013). This has generated a significant increase of public 
expenditure (Lico and Ríos, 2014; Pascual, 2010). Therefore, these results indicated that to 
attain a reduction of public expenditure it is necessary to terminate agencies (Carpenter and 
Lewis, 2004; MacCarthaigh, 2014; Nakrosis and Budraitis, 2012; Sarapuu, 2012). Further-
more, according to James and Van Thiel (2013) our results also can be explained by decen-
tralisation preventing public administrations from benefitting from economies of scale, and 
as well generating a loss of coordination between the different levels of government, causing 
duplicities, a rise in the number of public workers and, ultimately, increasing costs. On the 
other hand, PCSE is employed as a robustness test as an alternative statistical methodology 
(Model 3). The findings are consistent with those previously commented on.
The financial crisis has caused politicians to focus on ways of reducing the growth of 
government expenditure (Flinders and Skelcher, 2012; Giordano et al., 2015) and its effi-
ciency (Elston and MacCarthaigh, 2016). Thus, in this context we investigate the moderat-
ing effects of the cost reduction period on quangos and its relationship with overall public 
expenditure. We tested the effect of adopting measures to reduce public sector expenditure 
from the year 2010. Table 7 presents the results from the regression analyses. Concretely, 
Model 1 reports the potential moderation of the cost reduction period in the link between 
the number of quangos and public expenditure. Our evidence shows that the period of aus-
terity measures (Quangos*Level shift 2010) negatively moderates the relationship between 
the number of quangos and the government expenditure, thus supporting Hypothesis 2. The 
causes or motives which lead to the elimination of quangos can be internal –inefficiencies, 
ineffectiveness– or external –a change of the government’s political sign, an economic crisis 
(Lewis, 2002; Park, 2013). In this sense, Carpenter and Lewis (2004) point out that the de-
cision to eliminate quangos is affected by fiscal pressures and deficit reduction. Specifically, 
our results stress that the reduction of quangos in the CCAA has taken place as a consequence 
of the pressure from the European Union on the member countries for them to reduce their 
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deficits. On the other hand, prior to 2010 in the United Kingdom, and as a consequence of the 
global crisis, the government adopted the reduction of the number of quangos as an austerity 
measure. However, the objective proposed was not achieved because there was not a reduc-
tion of resources (Heald and Steel, 2018). Therefore, in 2010 policies were imposed to reduce 
them.  The decrease of public expenditure has not only taken place due to the elimination or 
restructuring of the quangos, the containment and the reduction of public employment sala-
ries have also contributed to this (Giordano et al., 2015; Ramos et al., 2014). Other countries 
of the European Union, such as Ireland, Greece, Italy, Cyprus, Portugal, Austria, Denmark 
and the United Kingdom, applied these measures and achieved similar results related to the 
reduction of public expenditure (Giordano et al., 2015; Hernández et al., 2016). According 
to the reports published by the Spanish Government, a saving of about 24,000 million euros 
has been achieved, basically by savings in staff costs. Public sector salaries have suffered 
significant adjudgments according to the fiscal policies implemented, mainly they were fro-
zen, and they have been affected by a great number of public job losses (Ramos et al., 2014). 
Consequently, public employees’ salaries grew more than those of private sector employees 
in the period 1999-2007 (Giordano et al., 2015).
Table 6
DO QUANGOS LEAD TO HIGHER GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE? 
RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Panel Data PCSE
Variables
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Quangos 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.000*
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Salary 12.829*** 3.112** 1.500***
(2.516) (1.405) (0.728)
Government employment 0.542 0.204 0.003
(0.528) (0.205) (0.069)
Leverage -2.155*** -0.744** -0.278**
(0.480) (0.295) (0.138)
Unemployment 0.006 -0.016*** -0.008***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.003)
Level shift 2010 0.272***
(0.102)
Years dummies Yes Yes
Observations 240 240 224
R-squared 0.304 0.906 0.965
F-Test / Wald Chi 15.85*** 104.39*** 22824.18***
Note: T-statistics in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance * for p-value (p) < 0.10; 
** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
In this manner, evidence was found that the adoption of policies to control public expend-
iture, has achieved the main objective, which was the reduction of public sector expenditure. 
As robustness tests, we then replicated the previous analysis considering PCSE methodology 
(Model 2), confirming the previous results. 
 
SILVIA FRESNEDA, NURIA REGUERA AND FERNANDO CASAS58
Table 7
DOES THE DE-AGENTIFICATION PROCESS REDUCE THE GOVERNMENT 
EXPENDITURE BY A REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF QUANGOS? 
RESULTS OF THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Panel Data PCSE
Variables
Model 1 Model 2
Quangos 0.012*** 0.002**
(0.002) (0.001)














F-Test / Wald Chi 19.20*** 36.08***
Note: T-statistics in parentheses. Asterisks denote statistical significance * for p-value 
(p) < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
5. Conclusions
Actions to reduce public expenditure in Spain have led to the introduction of diverse 
measures in the different territorial levels–State, the CCAA and LGs. Among these measures 
the elimination of quangos stands out. This article analyses the effects which plans of the ra-
tionalisation of public organisms implemented by the CCAA have had on public expenditure. 
In this sense, this paper provides new empirical evidence concerning the effect of the creation 
of quangos and the de-agentification process on public expenditure.
Due to ongoing political debates in the European Union, and particularly in Spain, re-
garding the efficiency of quangos, governments are being forced to think about how to solve 
the problem of managing to reduce public expenditure. One major concern is whether or 
not quangos achieve a reduction of costs. Some authors justify the cost savings as the main 
reasons that justified their existence (MacCarthaig, 2014; Park, 2013). However, in the case 
in which these savings have been produced, the effect on the reduction of public expenditure 
has been overridden by the increase of expenditure of other items. This is why, when the need 
arises to control public expenditure and reduce the size of the public sector in Spain, the same 
as in other European countries, one of the strategies for the reduction of total public expend-
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iture has been the reduction of the number of quangos (Carpenter and Lewis, 2004; Lewis, 
2002; MacCarthaigh, 2014; Nakrosis and Budraitis, 2012; Park, 2013; Sarapuu, 2012).
On the other hand, the de-agentification process was implemented by European countries 
according to the Stability and Growth Pact. Thus, in Spain, as in other countries, it was neces-
sary to implement some measures to control public expenditure. In this sense, in the literature 
there is not a consensus related to the effectiveness of these measures. Our findings support 
the contribution of the de-agentification process to the reduction of government expendi-
ture. However, these results are contrary to those obtained in countries such as Italy, where 
the reduction of the quangos has not cut public expenditure (Buglione et al., 2013; Cabinet 
Office, 2015; Deloitte, 2015). Mainly, the differences related to the empirical evidence are a 
consequence of the way these measures have been implemented.
This study makes an important contribution both to research and policy debates. Firstly, 
it offers what is, to our knowledge, one of the first quantitative evaluations of the impact of 
the cost reduction process on public expenditure in Spain. In this regard, the study fills an 
important gap in the literature by responding to the policies which the governments should 
implement to achieve a reduction of public expenditure. Secondly, our results help to advance 
debates regarding the impact of some policies on controlling public sector expenditure. Con-
trary to the initial arguments for the creation of quangos to reduce public expenditure, they 
actually contribute to increasing this expenditure. In this respect, our findings lend support 
to both critical and cautious accounts which have questioned the creation of quangos. In this 
sense, a future line of research could be the study of the reasons why the creation of quan-
gos has not reduced public expenditure but has, on the contrary, contributed to increasing it. 
Moreover, the main element of the latter is the idea that policies should not interfere with 
day-to-day organisational practice, so that agencies can concentrate on their main executive 
tasks. Thus, their efficiency can depend on the labour of their directors. Therefore, a future 
line of research could be to go thoroughly into the analysis of the skills and experience of 
directors who manage quangos.
This paper reveals a limitation that may be considered when undertaking future research. 
Although Spain offers a relevant context for analysing the evolution of its public expendi-
ture, there is not available data related to the expenditure and the number of employees of 
the quangos.
Notes
1.  Re-centralisation is the opposite process to decentralisation. Re-centralisation implies the regrouping in higher 
levels of competences previously transferred or delegated to lower instances. On the other hand, Falleti (2005) 
defines the concept of decentralisation as ‘a process or reform consisting of a number of public policies that 
transfer responsibility, resources, or authority from a higher to a lower level of government. It can be at the 
fiscal, administrative or political level’.
2. There is not a generic term which groups together the different entities that are dependent on public administra-
tions (agencies, quangos, autonomous organisms, public firms, etc.). This work is going to use the term quango 
or agency to refer to all these bodies.
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3. In Spain there are 20 CCAA, however, we could not include the País Vasco, Ceuta and Melilla because their 
data were not available.
4. The Spanish state is territorially divided into three levels. The General Administration of the State, the Admin-
istration of the Regional Governments and the Administration of the Local Governments (hereinafter: LGs). At 
each level, the administrative entities coexist with the instrumental entities. 
5. For a better comprehension of the different figures which make up the institutional public sector see Title II, 
Chapters I to VIII of the Law 40/2015.
6. Agreement of 1/2010, of March 22, of the Council of Tax and Financial Policy, by which the framework 
agreement with the CCAA and Cities with Autonomous Status concerning the sustainability of public finances 
2010-2013 is adopted.
7. The European system of national and regional accounts was passed by the Regulation (EC) 2223/96 of the 
Council, 25 June 1996 and later reformed by the Regulation Nº 549/2013 of the European Parliament and of 
the Council, 21 May 2013. In Spain the article of the Organic Law 2/2012, 27 April, of Budget Stability and 
Financial Sustainability replicates the content of this regulation. 
8. See Manuals of calculation of the deficit in the national accounting and conciliation document between the 
public accounting and the data of the SEC 2010 published by the General Intervention Board of the State Ad-
ministration (IGAE).
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Resumen
El objetivo de este trabajo es analizar el efecto que el proceso de reestructuración del sector público 
institucional autonómico desarrollado en España desde el año 2010 ha tenido sobre el gasto público. 
Para ello, se ha utilizado una muestra formada por 17 comunidades autónomas durante el periodo 
2003-2017. Aplicando la metodología de datos de panel los resultados muestran una asociación posi-
tiva entre el número de entes institucionales y el gasto público. Por tanto, nuestros resultados contribu-
yen al debate existente sobre los posibles beneficios que tiene la creación de tales entidades públicas 
para contener, o incluso reducir, el gasto público.
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